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Abstract 
Most comparative studies on corruption are geared towards the analysis of factors 
dealing with the selection and the incentives of actors taking policy decisions in a 
state. With few exceptions, such as Rauch & Evans (2000), the selection and 
incentives of actors within the state apparatus in charge of implementing policies have 
been neglected. In turn, the studies that take bureaucratic features into account do not 
control for political institutions. This paper aims at bridging the gap between these 
two institutionalist approaches by analyzing an original dataset from a survey 
answered by 520 experts from 52 countries. There are two main empirical findings. 
First, some bureaucratic factors, and especially meritocratic recruitment, reduce 
corruption, even when controlling for the impact of most standard political variables 
such as years of democracy, the number of veto players or the type of electoral 
system. Second, the analysis shows that other allegedly relevant features in the 
bureaucratic institutionalist literature, such as public employees’ competitive salaries, 
career stability or internal promotion, do not have a significant impact. 
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Introduction 
A growing literature, mainly in economics and political science, has highlighted the 
importance of non-corrupt government institutions. Scholars and policy-makers agree 
that “good governance”, “state capacity”, and “quality of government” foster social 
and economic development, and economists have started to view dysfunctional 
government institutions as the most serious obstacle to economic development across 
the globe (e.g., Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 2002; 
Easterly and Levine 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004). Students of social 
capital, while originally viewing civil society as the main provider of interpersonal 
trust (Putnam 1993), have shifted their attention to administrative corruption and bad 
governance (Rothstein and Uslaner 2007; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Rothstein and 
Eek 2009). Even scholars of international relations are paying increasing attention to 
the importance of governance institutions, either for the outbreak of interstate wars 
(Mansfield and Snyder 2005) or for the sustainability of civil peace in war-torn 
countries (Paris 2004). 
Although the positive effects from non-corrupt government institutions seems 
fairly undisputed today, the unanswered question is still why some states have been 
able to establish non-corrupt institutions, while others can not get rid of corruption 
and bad government. In answering that question the literature is heavily geared 
towards what can be called the political side of the state. They examine the effect of 
democracy, electoral systems or veto players, factors dealing with the selection 
mechanisms and incentives of those who take policy decisions. Thus, while the few 
individuals at the top of the state apparatus – e.g. the President, the members of the 
cabinet or the MPs – have been analyzed in the comparative literature on corruption, 
the bulk majority of members of the state apparatus – in many countries millions of 
individuals – have been overlooked. There are only a few examples in the literature, 
such as Rauch and Evans (2000), where the bureaucratic side of the state has been 
taken into account. Yet, in turn, these few studies neglect the political factors.  
In sum, even though there are indications that both political and bureaucratic 
factors do seem to matter for controlling corruption, they have not been systematically 
tested together. This paper aims at bridging the gap between these two alternative 
institutional approaches by testing Rauch and Evans’ (2000) bureaucratic structure 
hypotheses together with the most prevailing factors in the political institutionalist 
literature. In order to do so the paper uses an original dataset based on a survey, 
answered by 520 experts from 52 countries, which to the best of our knowledge 
represents the hitherto most encompassing dataset on bureaucratic structures at the 
cross-country level. 
This paper explores both which particular bureaucratic features do matter for 
corruption, and through which mechanisms they reduce corruption. While previous 
literature on bureaucracies (e.g. Rauch and Evans 2000) relies heavily on socialization 
– an esprit de corps – as the main causal mechanism, this paper suggests another 
mechanism, namely the existence of separation of interests between politicians and 
bureaucrats. This mechanism does not require any assumptions on higher competence, 
higher morals or in any other way “better” nature of professional, merit-recruited, 
bureaucrats vis-à-vis political appointees, but simply that professional bureaucrats are 
responsive to a different chain of accountability than politicians. Thus, it is not that 
professional bureaucrats are “better types”; they are just “different types”. And with 
politicians and professional bureaucrats, with known different interests, involved in 
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policy-making and implementation, collusion for taking bribes becomes a more 
strenuous collective action problem to solve, and thus less likely.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section critically 
reviews the two literatures of corruption which hardly speak to each other: the 
politico-institutionalist, and the bureaucratic-institutionalist. The paper subsequently 
disentangles the concept most associated the bureaucratic-institutionalist literature: 
which of the multiple features traditionally associated to a so-called Weberian 
bureaucracy do matter for controlling corruption? And, more importantly, through 
which mechanisms do they act to curb corruption? A data and methods section 
presents how the original dataset on bureaucratic features has been built from a 
country expert survey launched by The Quality of Government Institute (Teorell et al. 
2008b) and introduces the political and bureaucratic factors which will be tested in the 
posterior empirical section.  
The two main findings of the empirical analysis are, first, that some bureaucratic 
factors such as the development of a professional bureaucracy exert a significant 
influence even when controlling for the impact of most standard political variables 
found as significant in the political institutionalist literature; and, second, that other 
allegedly relevant features for the bureaucratic literature, such as competitive salaries, 
career stability or formal exams for bureaucrats do not have an impact on their own. 
Politics and Bureaucracy 
One can distinguish between two types of institutionalist explanations of corruption: a 
majority of studies that stresses political institutions and a minority that emphasize 
bureaucratic institutions. What is theorized to matter for the former is who the rulers 
are, how we select them, which incentives they have and how they take policy 
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decisions, and what matters for the latter are the characteristics of the bureaucrats 
giving policy-advice and implementing decisions. 
Generally speaking, most of the institutionalist literature – in theoretical, but 
especially in empirical terms – has focused on political factors as the main state-
related factors for explaining corruption. To start with, there are numerous cross-
country studies dealing with the impact of the type of political regime over 
corruption: are democratic states more or less corrupt than authoritarian ones? In 
particular, many authors have explored what Harris-White and White (1996, 3) and 
Sung (2004, 179) define as the “contradictory” relationship between democracy and 
corruption: there seems to be a significant relationship between democracy and 
corruption, but it is a non-linear one. This non-linearity has been defined as either a 
U-shaped (e.g., Montinola and Jackman 2002), a J-shaped (e.g., Bäck and Hadenius 
2008), or an S-shaped (e.g., Sung 2004) relationship. In terms of control of corruption 
and quality of government, younger democracies perform worse than authoritarian 
regimes and much worse than older democracies (Keefer 2007). In consolidated 
democracies politicians may be capable of building reputations as providers of good 
public policies, but that may be too costly for politicians in younger democracies. The 
latter may prefer to rely on patrons and, as a result, younger democracies will tend to 
over-provide clientelistic policies and be more corrupt than older ones. 
A second political factor that the institutionalist literature finds relevant for 
explaining cross-country differences in corruption levels is who composes the 
political elites of a country. In particular, a consistent finding in the literature is that 
the higher the number of women in the national parliament of a country, even after 
controlling for other relevant political factors, the lower the level of corruption 
(Treisman 2000; Dollar et al. 2001). Although the causal direction of this relationship 
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is unclear (Sung 2003), the significant effect of the number of women in parliament 
for the development of certain public policies is a reason to take this relationship 
seriously (Wängnerud 2008). Everything else being equal, having women in political 
positions may matter for reducing corruption. 
A third political factor follows, in general, from the virtues associated to 
separation of powers and, in particular, from Tsebelis’ (1995) veto player theory. 
Along those lines, Andrews and Montinola (2004) understand corruption as a 
coordination game among the different relevant actors within a polity. The more veto 
players, the more difficult coordination among them will be and, thus, the lower the 
level of corruption a country will have. Andrews and Montinola (2004) find support 
for this hypothesis in an analysis of 35 emerging democracies for two decades. Using 
a similar argument, Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) consider that since in 
presidential systems elected officials cannot make credible commitments to each 
other, rent-seeking and corruption will be lower than in parliamentary regimes. 
A fourth group of political factors traditionally seen as related to corruption are 
the characteristics of the electoral system. As comparative studies have shown, the 
impact of the classical distinction between majoritarian and PR systems over 
corruption must be qualified, and its different components must be analyzed 
separately. A feature linked to PR systems – the existence of large voting districts – 
has positive effect in controlling corruption. The mechanism behind that relationship 
would be that larger voting districts lower the barriers to entry. At the same time, a 
characteristic of majoritarian systems – a higher share of MPs elected in single-
member districts – also leads to lower levels of corruption. The mechanism in this 
case would be that when candidates are elected from party lists have lower levels of 
individual accountability, and thus, more prone to engage in corrupt activities 
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(Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2003; cf. Kunikova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Chang 
and Golden 2006). 
All these political institutions have been found as having a significant impact on 
corruption in the literature and this paper will subject them to empirical testing. 
Nevertheless, we argue that these political arguments only offer us one side of the 
institutionalist story. There is a set of traditionally neglected factors in the most 
empirical institutionalist studies that may also have a relevant say for explaining the 
level of corruption of a country: the features of its bureaucracy. 
From a mostly theoretical point of view, the latest decade has been a “time to 
rediscover bureaucracy” (Olsen 2005, 1) and numerous authors have provided a 
strong defence for and predicted a return to the Weberian bureaucratic organization 
(Suleiman 2003, Pollit and Bouckaert 2004, ch. 8). Contrary to the prediction of 
numerous scholars and international organizations in the 1980s and 1990s, Weberian 
bureaucracy does not seem nowadays an “organizational dinosaur helplessly involved 
in its death struggle” (Olsen 2005), but has been found to have positive effects in 
terms of good governance – specially in small-N studies (Wade 1990, Evans 1995). 
Nevertheless, the Weberian bureaucratic ideal-type of administration contains very 
diverse structural characteristics; e.g. a formalized, standardized, hierarchical and 
specialized bureau plus a professional administrative staff with merit-based lifelong 
employment and organized careers. The diverse components of Weberian 
bureaucracies may not necessarily occur together in practice (Hall 1963; Olsen 2008), 
and there is a lack of comparative data on bureaucratic features that may travel well 
from one country to another. We are thus left with the intriguing question of which 
characteristics of Weberian bureaucracies, if any, contribute to good government and 
the control of corruption. 
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Rauch and Evans (2000) address that question in a pioneering study of 35 
developing countries. They test the impact of three structural components of the 
“Weberian state hypothesis” on corruption and bureaucratic performance: the level of 
meritocratic recruitment, the existence of competitive salaries and the degree of 
internal promotion and career stability. While the effect of the latter two could not be 
clearly established, the level of meritocratic recruitment seemed to reduce the level of 
corruption in the pool of countries analyzed. It is important to note here that Rauch 
and Evans understand merit recruitment in a formal way as the existence of 
competitive formal examinations and the possession of university degrees among the 
employees of core economic agencies.  
Despite the innovative nature of Rauch and Evans’ analysis, obvious when 
taking into account the large number of studies which have used their dataset since 
(see for example Henderson et al 2007), there are several reasons which lead us to 
undertake a further study of the relationship between bureaucratic features and 
corruption. 
Firstly, Rauch and Evans (2000) do not control for the standard political 
variables of the institutionalism literature. Hence, the relationships they find between 
merit-based bureaucracy and control of corruption could simply disappear once one 
includes variables regarding the nature of the political regime. 
Secondly, the sample of 35 countries selected – 30 “semi-industrialized” 
countries in 1980 plus 5 poorer countries selected to increase the representation of 
other world regions – could be formed by countries at a critical stage of economic 
development, precisely when bureaucratic characteristics could be more necessary 
according to the ‘developmental state’ literature. In particular, the so-called East 
Asian tigers, the development of which has been more clearly connected to state 
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policies (Amsten 1989; Johnson 1982; Wade 1990), are overrepresented in the 
sample. One could cast doubts about the inferences of their results for non-semi-
industrialized countries, such as in advanced industrial OECD countries, or for 
developing countries which have not followed the East Asian development path, such 
as the East European countries. 
Thirdly, it is not obvious what their theoretical mechanisms are. Rauch and 
Evans (2000, 53) seem to mostly rely on a cultural mechanism, namely the “esprit de 
corps” as their main micro-foundation connecting Weberian bureaucracy and good 
governance. Yet they do not offer clear guidelines on how the different bureaucratic 
features they test are proxies for this or other alternative mechanisms. This motivates 
the theoretical contribution of this paper: to detect the particular bureaucratic features 
relevant for tackling corruption and identify the mechanisms through which they act. 
 
How Does Bureaucratic Structure Affect Corruption? 
Since Max Weber’s (1978) monumental essays, written nearly 100 years ago, the 
positive effects of his bureaucratic ideal-type have been discussed by numerous 
scholars in political science, public administration and sociology. There are several 
characteristics of the ideal Weberian bureaucracy with an un-theorized relationship 
with corruption. This paper focuses on the features that probably are especially 
important for explaining corruption – that is, the characteristics of staff policy: how 
public employees are selected and which incentives they face. Similar to Evans and 
Rauch (1999, 2000), we exclusively look at “the relevant determinants of recruitment 
and career patterns for bureaucrats” (1999, 749). The difficult question is thus to 
establish what these “relevant” bureaucratic features are.  
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Table 1 summarizes the alternative (unobservable) causal mechanisms and the 
partially overlapping (observable) bureaucratic features that should have a positive 
impact in the control of corruption according to each mechanism. 
 
*** Table 1 around here *** 
 
The first mechanism has to do with the levels of competence among the 
employees selected to join the public service. In order to improve bureaucratic 
performance and diminish corrupt practices, one should select “better types”. This can 
be done through two related procedures. These two should be distinguished, as to 
clarify the posterior empirical analysis and because the normative implications in 
terms of how public employees should be selected may be quite different. Using the 
principal-agent theory terminology, a first option would be to “screen” the potential 
pool of candidates and select the most competent among them. This could be done in 
a similar fashion as private-sector firms select employees – with a discretionary 
evaluation of the CV and through standard interviews – such as is common in many 
public agencies in countries like Sweden or New Zealand. Alternatively, one can ask 
candidates to “signal” their capabilities in a competitive formal examination or in a 
given educational degree – that is, the standard entry procedure to administrative 
Corps of functionaries in countries like France or Spain. These are thus two 
observable characteristics of this mechanism of “selecting better types” that do not 
need to go hand in hand. The first observable recruitment feature would thus be the 
extent to which the administration “screens” would-be public employees according to 
their merit as opposed to their acquaintance or loyalty to their political superiors. 
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Another observable recruitment feature would be the extent to which candidates must 
“signal” their merit through formal competitive exams.  
The second mechanism would not deal with how to prevent adverse selection 
but how to reduce moral hazard. In simple words, this mechanism would consist of 
“creating better types” through socialization and thereby generate an esprit de corps. 
The driving force would be the development of a set of common norms within the 
bureaucracy for fostering impartial and non-corrupt behavior. Those norms would be 
the joint effect of many characteristics of what the literature defines as a closed civil 
service system (Bekke, Perry and Toonen 1996, 5; Lægreid and Wise 2007, 171). 
Later, in the empirical section we will use this term – the closedness of the 
bureaucracy – in order to capture the esprit de corps mechanism. Contrary to open 
bureaucratic systems, closed bureaucracies are characterized by the existence of 
career stability and lifelong tenure, the prevalence of internal promotions over lateral 
entries to the public service, and the development of special laws covering the terms 
of employment for public sector employees instead of the general labor laws 
prevailing in the country. The high number of interactions among the public servants 
within the same Corps would create a sense of common norms which would 
discourage corrupt behaviors. This would be the most decisive mechanism of a 
Weberian bureaucracy for Rauch and Evans. As they summarize, the formation of 
stronger ties among public employees reinforces the adherence to codified rules of 
behavior and, “ideally, a sense of commitment to corporate goals and ‘esprit de corps’ 
develop” (Rauch and Evans 2000, 52). 
The third mechanism, in table 1 called the temptation mechanism, works against 
corruption mainly through wage policy. It is a classical premise in the literature on 
bureaucracies and corruption to assume that public servants maximize expected 
 10
income. Traditionally scholars have analyzed both bureaucrats’ wages and penalties 
for corruption within the framework of a cost-benefit analysis in which economic 
incentives – carrots and sticks – should be set so that public servants are not tempted 
to engage in corrupt behavior (Becker and Stigler 1974). Studies do not agree if it is 
the relative level of wages in comparison to private sector ones, or their perceived 
fairness that ultimately could deter corrupt behavior. The general idea, although it is 
inherently difficult to subject to empirical scrutiny, is that public servants incentives 
can be affected by, on the one hand, their wage and, on the other, the probability of 
detection and the penalty for corruption (Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001, 308).  
One major caveat of this bureaucratic literature is that it is not clear that these 
three mechanisms are backed empirically. The result from Rauch and Evans (2000) 
seminal article does in fact give a very mixed support for these standard mechanisms 
in the Weberian bureaucracy literature. Only their meritocratic recruitment variable 
seems to exhibit a systematic effect on the control of corruption. Nevertheless, their 
proxies for internal promotion and career stability, despite being linked to their main 
theoretical mechanism – the development of an esprit de corps – do not show a clear 
effect on reducing corruption. Also when it comes to the effect of competitive wages 
– the temptation mechanism – the empirical evidence is mixed. Rauch and Evans 
(2000) do not find empirical support for this mechanism, while other studies do (Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder 2001).  
In addition to these mechanisms, we suggest another one which has been 
overlooked in the literature on bureaucracy and corruption, but can be compatible 
with the findings of Rauch and Evans (2000). We refer to this mechanism as the 
separation of interests mechanism. 
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The basic idea is that the existence of a professional bureaucracy reduces 
corruption not by virtue of selecting more competent agents, but by introducing 
agents with known different interests to those of politicians. A meritocratic 
recruitment of bureaucrats, which politicians do not influence, is probably the 
decisive way to create separation of interests between bureaucrats and politicians. 
With elected officials on one side and non-politically recruited bureaucrats on the 
other we have two groups with different chains of responsiveness and thus with 
different interests. Since Woodrow Wilson’s (1887) classic assessment, students of 
public administration have warned against the negative effects produced by merging 
the roles of politicians and bureaucrats (see for example Aberbach et al 1981; Peters 
and Pierre 2004; Simon 1958; Weber 1968).  
Scholars from transaction-cost-economics have also observed the potential 
negative effects of a uniform provider of public goods. Miller and Hammond (1994) 
formally show that any provider of public goods has incentives to maximize the 
“residual” inherently generated by the supply of any public good at the expense of 
social efficiency. In other words, they have incentives to misuse public office for 
private gain or to be corrupt. Citizens therefore face the problem of how to “constrain 
the political leader from giving in to incentives for abuse and inefficiency” (Miller 
and Hammond 1994, 24). Miller and Falaschetti (2001) stress that there is no perfect 
solution to this dilemma, and there will always be some room of manoeuvre for 
dishonest behaviour, but a way to minimize it is to transform the residual-owner into a 
team of agents with “known different interests”, in our case professional bureaucrats 
on the one hand and politicians on the other hand. As a result of their heterogeneous 
nature, these agents will face a collective action problem in case they want to collude 
for undertaking a corrupt activity. As a most preferred example of a “residual-
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minimizing” polity Miller and Hammond (1994, 23) propose the establishing of a 
“professional bureaucrat” who counterbalances the more homogeneous interests of 
elected politicians. 
It is important to remark here that, unlike in the competence mechanism, what 
prevents corruption here is not that merit-recruited bureaucrats are “better types” than 
the political appointed ones, but that they are simply “different types.” Our main point 
is that involvement from both politicians and the professional bureaucracy is needed 
to curb corruption. If an administration was exclusively composed of merit-based 
bureaucrats without any political control, one could also expect relatively high levels 
of corruption. Autonomous merit-based bureaucrats also need to be counter-balanced 
by agents with a different (e.g. political) nature. For example, this could be illustrated 
by the numerous complaints about corruption and opacity in the most autonomous 
administrative corps of some bureaucratic authoritarian states such as Franco’s Spain 
(Lapuente 2007, 221-224).  
Following this argument, we consider there are two reasons for why a 
professional bureaucracy could hamper corruption. First, introducing bureaucratic 
agents with separated interests to those of their principals creates coordination 
problems for opportunistic actions such as accepting bribes or organizing kick-backs. 
Either elected officials or professional bureaucrats may engage in corrupt behaviour, 
but this requires coordination with actors with different interests. Generally speaking, 
weakening the ties between politicians and bureaucrats diminishes the possibility of 
collusion and increases the chances for both types to reveal corrupt actions taken by 
the other type.  
Second, since we have individuals who are recruited from two different 
constituencies, one political and one professional, two parallel hierarchies of 
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accountability are created. As Alesina and Tabellini point out, “the main difference 
between top-level politicians and top level bureaucrats lies in how they are held 
accountable. Politicians are held accountable, by voters, at election time. Top-level 
bureaucrats are accountable to their professional peers or to the public at large, for 
how they have fulfilled the goals of their organization” (Alesina and Tabellini 2007, 
169-170). Consequently, the careers of professional civil servants become 
independent from the careers of political incumbents. The future prospects of civil 
servants – inside or outside the administration – will depend on their professional 
status and not on following politicians’ instructions. 
Together, the two reasons just outlined give the micro-foundation of the 
separation of interest mechanism. Contrary to a political appointee, a professional 
bureaucrat will not have much to gain from playing along if she observes corrupt 
behaviour of politicians. She has for example no interest in rewarding the supporters 
of any particular politician, because her carrier is not dependent on the re-election of 
any political sponsor, but on the judgement of her professional peers. She has, 
however, much to loose if she doesn’t expose corrupt behaviour. If it is revealed that 
she has known about corruption without exposing it her career is damaged, and her 
professional peers – who has not gained from the corruption – has no interest in 
protecting her.  
Data and methods  
In order to test the theoretical arguments deployed in table 1, we need data on both 
corruption and the structure of the bureaucracy. For a measure of corruption we rely 
on the widely used World Bank Governance Indicator “Control of corruption” 
(Kaufmann et al. 2006). This is a perceptions-based measure of corruption, “including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
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private interests,” and draws on 19 different data sources (ibid., 4, 89).1 It is 
sometimes argued that both administrative and political corruption should not be 
collapsed into one composite measure. From our theoretical perspective, however, 
this might not be that much of a problem, since the separation of interest mechanism 
should be expected to reduce both forms of corruption. 
The more daunting task is to find useful gauges of the structure of public 
administration. For this purpose we have collected original data on a cross-section of 
countries, the so-called “Quality of Government Institute Quality of Government 
Survey” based on a country-expert survey answered by 529 public administration 
experts worldwide (Teorell et al. 2008b). In this paper we present the first results from 
this data collection.2 Despite receiving responses by experts on 58 countries, to 
enhance data quality, this paper exclusively relies on the 52 countries for which at 
least 3 expert responses have been obtained. Western Europe and Northern America 
together with post-communist Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union carry the 
weight of countries covered. Only seven non-Western and non-post-communist-
countries are covered by at least three respondents: India, Brazil, South Africa, Japan, 
South Korea, Mexico, and Turkey, the last four of which are OECD members. By and 
large, then, our sample of countries is heavily geared towards the developed world. 
The questionnaire items relevant for gauging the structure of the public 
administration are presented in Appendix B. For present purposes we have 
concentrated on the 8 items that tap into the features of public administration for 
                                                 
1 All data on corruption, together with the control variables, are from the Quality of Government 
Dataset (Teorell et al. 2008a). We prefer the World Bank Institute measure over the ”Corruption 
perception index” (CPI) produced by Transparency International for the simple reason that it is based 
on a somewhat expanded sample of countries. The two indicators are however very strongly correlated 
(at around .95, depending on the year and sample selection), and mostly rely on the same underlying 
original sources. Robustness tests with the CPI measure do not indicate any substantial differences in 
our results. 
2 Appendix A offers a detailed description of the design and implementation of the survey as well as 
the methods for country and expert selections. 
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which we developed the theoretical expectations in Table 1 above. These include the 
extent to which recruitment is based on merit (q2_a) and formal examinations (q2_c) 
rather than political criteria (q2_b, q2_d), as well as the extent to which promotion 
within the hierarchy is an internal affair (q2_e) and is based on lifelong career paths 
(q2_f). Competitive salaries (q2_k) and special protection from extraordinary labor 
laws (q8_1) are other components of this assemblage of features.  
These questions are capturing different bureaucratic characteristics, and could 
be seen as indicators of different causal mechanisms discussed in the previous section. 
In order to make the hypothesised relationship between separation of interest and 
control of corruption testable, we create a bureaucratic professionalism index 
capturing the separation of interest mechanism. We also introduce a bureaucratic 
closedness index capturing the esprit de corps mechanism, as the main alternative 
from the literature on Weberian bureaucracy. Additionally, we include a question 
measuring to what extent the salaries in the bureaucracy are competitive in the 
analysis. 
One obvious drawback from using the two indices is that the observable features 
of the so-called competence mechanism are captured by one question in the 
professionalism index (on meritocratic recruitment) and one question in the 
bureaucratic closedness index (on formal examinations). Trying to handle this and 
other overlapping observable implications, we also introduce one question at the time 
in a separate empirical analysis.  
When creating the indices, we have performed a country-level principal 
components factor analysis of the above mentioned 8 items, the results of which are 
reported in Table 2. In a first dimension, meritocratic recruitment and internal 
promotion appear as strongly connected with a non-politicized bureaucracy tapping 
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into the degree of professionalism in the public administration. In the second 
dimension, the use of formal examination systems is intimately connected to having 
lifelong careers and protection through special employment regulations, capturing the 
distinction between open and closed civil service systems. The final component, 
competitive salaries, does not conclusively belong to either of these dimensions. As 
already mentioned, we will thus treat it as a separate indicator of the public 
administration structure in the analyses to come. 
 
*** Table 2 around here *** 
 
Based on these results, we construct the professionalism and the closedness 
factor indices. These scores are computed as an additive index, weighted by their 
respective factor loadings. By construction, the factor scores have zero means and unit 
standard deviation. The cross-country variations in these indices, together with the 
remaining competitive salaries indicator, are presented in Figure 1-3. 
 
*** Figure 1-3 around here *** 
 
In figure 1 we find mainly countries belonging to the Anglo-American tradition, 
such as Ireland, New Zealand and the UK, or to the Scandinavian administrative 
tradition, such as Norway, Denmark and Sweden, at the top of the Bureaucratic 
Professionalism continuum, which is not very surprising. However, here we also find 
countries belonging to the East Asian administrative tradition, like Japan and Korea, 
known for having a strong professional bureaucracy (Painter and Peters, 
forthcoming). Further down we find countries with known high levels of politicization 
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of the civil service, such as Spain, Italy and Mexico (Dahlström, 2008; Matheson et al 
2007). Figure 2 captures how “closed” civil service systems are. Again, the ranking 
seems to correspond with established observations. The countries at the top are Brazil, 
India, Spain, France and Japan, where at least the tree later are often pointed out as 
the most clear examples of a closed bureaucratic structure (Silberman 1993, 12). 
When it comes to the competitive salaries, presented in figure 3, the admittedly few 
countries that are overlapping in our sample and the Evans and Rauch sample seems 
also to be matching. Mexico and Korea are two of the countries with the most 
competitive salaries in both samples, while Spain is ranked fairly low (Rauch and 
Evans 2000, 66). 
 
Results 
We start the empirical analysis by testing the traditional political institutional 
variables vis-à-vis a bureaucratic professionalization variable, which we interpret as 
mainly capturing the separation of interest mechanism, while leaving the other 
dimensions of Weberianism, as well as their constitutive components, aside for a 
moment. As a proxy for this mechanism we rely on the professionalism index 
uncovered by the principal components analysis developed in the previous section. Its 
different components (the first four listed in Table 2) refer neatly to the bureaucratic 
features through which the mechanism of separation of political and professional 
interests is assumed to work (5a-c in Table 1). 
Table 3 reports a series of cross-country regressions with the “Control of 
corruption” indicator as our dependent variable, here reversed to enhance 
interpretability (so that higher scores means more corruption, and vice versa). In order 
to take cross-country variation in measurement error in the dependent variable into 
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account, we weigh observations in the cross-country regressions with the inverse of 
the standard errors of the corruption indicator. We have however refrained from 
trying to correct for random measurement error in the professionalism index, despite 
the fact that within-country variation among experts strongly indicate its presence. By 
implication, our estimates of the impact of professionalism (or any other measure 
from the expert survey) are presumably downwardly biased. 
 
*** Table 3 around here *** 
 
Since there is no agreed upon standard set of economic and political 
determinants of corruption to rely upon, we have tested several alternative 
specifications. The first, and most restrictive, model is an exact replica of Rauch and 
Evans’s (2000) specification, only including GDP per capita (logged), the level of 
education and degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The second model is instead 
geared towards factors that, apart from economic development and education, should 
help explain why certain countries introduce professional bureaucracies whereas 
others do not. Drawing on New Political Economy explanations of merit adoption, 
this means including proxies for what Lapuente and Nistotskaya (2009, 5) define as 
“intra-temporal and inter-temporal political fragmentation”– that is, up to which 
extent political power is fragmented today (i.e. the number of veto players or political 
constraints on the current executive), or is fragmented across time (i.e. level and years 
of democracy). In addition, we have also included the old Weberian cultural argument 
that a professional bureaucracy should be particularly suitable to a “protestant ethics”. 
Models (3) and (4) are more encompassing models of corruption. In one of the 
broadest literature reviews to date, Treisman (2007) argues that “quite strong evidence 
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suggests that highly developed, long-established liberal democracies, with a free and 
widely read press, a high share of women in parliament, and a history of openness to 
trade, are perceived as less corrupt” (2007, 211). We have thus in model (3) included 
measures for all these correlates of corruption. Moreover, in model (4) we have 
replicated the model used in Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi’s (2003) much-cited work 
on electoral rules and corruption, including the Rauch and Evans (2000) variables 
together with the inverse of the average district magnitude, the proportion of 
legislative candidates elected by plurality votes for individuals, level and years of 
democracy, Protestantism, Confucianism, trade volume and a dummy for OECD 
members. 
In model (5), finally, we have assembled a parsed control model where every 
determinant that comes out as statistically significant in any of models (1) through (4) 
is retained. In addition, regional dummies are introduced in order to wipe out the 
influence of some relatively extreme outliers.  
As can be seen, our index of bureaucratic professionalism works as a 
statistically significant deterrent of corruption across all these specifications. In the 
final parsed model, the coefficient of –.19 can be interpreted as indicating that an 
increase of about one standard deviation in the level of professionalism leads to about 
a fifth standard deviation decrease in the level of corruption, all else being equal.  
Thus, from the results of these different model specifications we can conclude 
that a cluster of bureaucratic features, in this analysis defined as bureaucratic 
professionalism (which is far from all the features considered as relevant in the 
literature on bureaucracies) significantly reduces corruption also when controlling for 
the effect of different political institutions.  
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Retaining the same parsed control model, we proceed now to test the different 
alternative mechanisms in Table 4. First, we tap our professionalism index against the 
second cluster of bureaucratic features emerging from the principal components 
analysis – the open vs. closed civil service dimension. The three highly correlated 
bureaucratic features of which it is formed correspond to two traditional theoretical 
mechanisms in the literature: the level of competence of employees (competitive 
formal examinations) and the esprit de corps (lifelong careers and special 
employment laws for public employees). We also compare the professionalism index 
vis-à-vis one of the most prevailing theoretical mechanisms in the literature of 
corruption: the competitiveness of public wages to deter temptations. 
Interestingly, only professionalism comes out as significant (albeit marginally) 
in this contest. The index for closed civil service systems even has the “wrong” sign 
(indicating that more closed systems have higher levels of corruption).3 This implies 
that those bureaucratic features that through the traditionally praised long-term 
socialization process in an esprit de corps should curb corruption are not supported in 
our data. Neither does temptation seem to work. In other words, in order to reduce 
corruption, neither the bureaucratic features traditionally linked to the internalization 
of norms, nor what public employees earn, seem to matter.  
In order to identify more precisely the mechanism/s creating the reduction in 
corruption, we take two additional steps. In model (2) we investigate the separate 
components of the professionalism index (here items q2_b and q2_d, both capturing 
politicization, have been averaged in order to reduce multicollinearity). Despite the 
fact that the components of the professionalism index are strongly interrelated, one of 
them clearly comes out as the strongest (albeit only marginally significant) deterrent 
                                                 
3 Both closedness and salaries are significantly related to corruption if entered individually to the 
model, but closedness positively so, and both their coefficients (in the case of salaries taking the 
variance into account) are about half the size of the coefficient for professionalism. 
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to corruption: having a recruitment system based on skills and merit. This indicator 
also, in model (3), trumps the separate components of the ‘civil service closedness’ 
index, none of which by themselves are significantly related to corruption. 
Regarding the theoretically deduced causal mechanisms, the implications from 
these three models are not perfectly conclusive. It is not clear if meritocratic 
recruitment is curbing corruption because “better types” have been selected as 
bureaucrats or because the interests of bureaucrats and politicians have been 
separated. Nevertheless, we interpret the results as speaking against both the ‘Esprit 
de Corps’ and the ‘temptation’ mechanisms. It should also be pointed out that one of 
the two indicators for the competence mechanism, namely formal examinations, does 
not have a statistically significant effect on the control of corruption. Again, although 
not conclusively, our interpretation is that this leaves us with the strongest support for 
one mechanism explaining why Weberian bureaucracies reduce corruption – selecting 
“different types” through meritocratic recruitment.  
 
*** Table 4 around here *** 
 
A potentially serious objection to these results concerns endogeneity bias. 
Having perceptions based measures at both side of the equation (albeit from different 
sources), how can we rule out the possibility that the administrations of the less 
corrupt countries are simply perceived as being more professional and merit-based? 
Unfortunately we cannot perfectly rule out this interpretation, but we can include one 
additional control that should at least ameliorate the problem: drawing on temporal 
variability in the corruption perceptions. Thus far we have solely relied on the latest 
cross-sectional measure of corruption available, from the year of 2007. In the last two 
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models of Table 4, however, we add controls for the earliest available measure, being 
from 1996. In effect this implies that we control for the lagged dependent variable, a 
potentially strong strategy for purging our estimates from endogeneity bias. 
As model (4) makes clear, this strategy reduces the effect of the professionalism 
index below standard thresholds for statistical significance.4 The merit indicator in 
model (5) however survives this control. By interpretation, a standard deviation 
difference in the extent of meritocratic recruitment corresponds to about a sixth of a 
standard deviation reduction in the perceived level of corruption in a country between 
1996 and 2005. In Figure 4 we display the partial regression plot for this final 
specification—that is, the relationship between meritocratic recruitment and 
corruption once the effects of all control variables, including the lagged dependent 
variable, have been taken into account. As the upper plot (a) indicates, Italy and 
Albania at first appear to be exerting undue influence on this result in terms of being 
relatively influential confirming outliers. On the other hand, Iceland pushes the result 
in the other direction by appearing as a disconfirming outlier. The lower plot (b) 
however demonstrates our result is robust to the exclusion of these three outliers (the 
partial correlation in both plots is –.38). 
To this we may finally add some empirical illustrations from the history of 
nowadays established Western democracies pointing out that meritocratic recruitment 
did not happen after – or as a result of – administrative corruption was curbed. To 
start with, while the British meritocratic reform of the administration was imposed by 
the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan report, which recommended strict merit selection 
procedures to join the Civil Service, the period known as the ‘Old Corruption’ would 
according to most historians’ accounts end in the 1860s (Harling 1995). The 
                                                 
4 It should be noted, however, that without the regional dummies in the model, professionalism comes 
out as statistically significant even in model (4). This result however hinges on the inclusion of one 
extremely influential outlier: South Africa 
 23
introduction of merit was thus not a consequence of a less corrupted administration, 
but, inversely, meritocratic recruitment was an instrument used by reform-minded 
politicians to curb corruption by putting an end to “fringe emoluments received by the 
major office-holders and their relatives” (Rubinstein 1983, 62). 
Similarly, the goal of the Progressive Era reformers who pushed for the adoption 
of merit recruitment systems (i.e. Civil Service Commissions) across US cities was 
mostly to disable the urban political machines in which corruption seemed to prosper 
(Van Riper 1958; Kelman 1987; Schultz and Maranto 1998). The US historical 
experience suggests that the extension of merit was the key for “righting the urban 
wrongs” of extensive corruption in US cities. This was due to the efforts of 
Progressive reformers who, by pushing for the establishment of merit recruitment 
systems, undertook “one of the great crusades of the age” (Teaford 1993, 30, 37). 
 
Conclusions 
In the literature on corruption, scholars have looked either to political explanations, or 
to bureaucratic explanations. Even though there are indications that both substantially 
affect corruption, they have not been tested together. The literature emphasizing 
political factors has a tendency to ignore the potential influence from the bureaucracy, 
while the bureaucracy literature, in turn, has not included insights regarding political 
factors.  
In this paper we have tried to bridge this gap, as we have empirically tested both 
types of factors. The empirical results show that even when controlling for a very 
broad range of political and institutional factors, bureaucratic professionalism is a 
statistically significant deterrent of corruption. Thereby this paper underlines the 
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importance of including measures of bureaucratic professionalism in general models 
explaining cross-country variance in corruption. 
The discussion about cross-country effects of Weberian bureaucracy has been 
fueled by the seminal work of Evans and Rauch (1999; 2000). However, as was 
recently pointed out by Olsen (2008), there are many different parts of a Weberian 
bureaucracy that do not necessarily go together empirically. Therefore, in the 
theoretical section of this paper we have disentangled the causal relationship between 
a Weberian bureaucracy and low levels of corruption. We identify three causal 
mechanisms from the literature and suggest one more, namely the separation of 
interest between bureaucrats and politicians. We argue that the interest of bureaucrats 
and politicians are separated when the bureaucracy is professionalized, and especially 
when bureaucrats are recruited according to skills and merit. We interpret the 
empirical results as supporting this notion and speaking against other, previously 
suggested Weberian mechanisms working through competitive salaries in the public 
sector, career stability, and formal examinations for bureaucrats. 
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APPENDIX A: Country and Expert Selection in the “Quality of Government 
Institute Quality of Government Survey 
 
After an open pilot survey available on our website in the Winter of 2007-2008, the 
main study has been conducted between September 2008 and May 2009 as a web 
survey of public administration experts in a wide array of countries. Although the 
scope of the survey is global in principle, we soon realized that there would be a 
trade-off between the number of countries we could include in the study, particularly 
from the developing world, and the information we could acquire on potential public 
administration experts to select for the sample. The solution to this problem that we 
opted for was to select experts first, and then let the experts, by themselves choosing 
the country for which they wanted to provide their responses, determine the selection 
of countries. In practice, what we did was to assemble a list of persons registered with 
four international networks for public administration scholars: The Network of 
Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe 
(NISPACEE), The European Group of Public Administration Scholars (EGPA), the 
European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA), and the Structure and 
Organization of Government (SOG) Research Committee at IPSA. The homepages of 
these scholarly networks provided the bulk of names of public administration scholars 
that was sent the questionnaire, but we also did some complementary searches on the 
internet, drew from personal contacts of scholars at the QoG Institute, and used the 
list of experts recruited from the pilot survey.  
All in all, this resulted in a sample of 1288 persons. We contacted these persons 
by email, including some background information on the survey, a request to take 
part, together with a clickable link inside the email leading to the web-based 
questionnaire in English. The only incentives presented to participants were access to 
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the data, a first-hand report, and the possibility of being invited to future conferences 
on the Quality of Government. 
After three reminders, 499 or 38.7 percent of these experts had responded, 
providing responses for 54 countries. In order to cover some underrepresented small 
European states, and to enhance the coverage of countries with critically low response 
rates, we launched a second wave of the survey beginning in January this year. This 
fresh sample was based on extended internet searches and personal contacts, with the 
addition of a snowballing component through which one responding expert could 
suggest other experts on his or her country. On May 25, 30 additional valid responses 
(41.1 %) out of 73 sampled experts had been collected, covering 9 countries (4 of 
which were not covered in the original sample). 
On the whole, this leaves us with 529 expert responses on 58 countries (see table 
below). The average respondent in this sample is a male (66 %), 47-year-old PhD (82 
%). An overwhelming majority of respondents were either born (90 %) or live (92 %) 
in the country for which they have provided their responses. To enhance data quality, 
we have in this paper exclusively relied on the 52 countries for which at least 3 expert 
responses have been obtained. While the number of respondents even among this 
restricted set of countries varies substantially, from only 3 for Brazil and Uzbekistan 
to a maximum of 28 in the Czech Republic, on average 10 experts per country have 
taken the time to respond to our survey. As should be expected from the sampling 
frame, Western Europe and Northern America together with post-communist Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union carry the weight of countries covered. 
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Number of Valid Responses by Country 
Country Respondents  Country Respondents 
Albania 11  South Korea 7 
Armenia 16  Kyrgyzstan 6 
Australia 10  Latvia 7 
Austria 5  Lithuania 11 
Azerbaijan 6  Luxembourg 1 
Belarus 9  Macedonia 7 
Belgium 7  Malta 4 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 7  Mauritius 1 
Brazil 3  Mexico 11 
Bulgaria 22  Netherlands 14 
Canada 13  New Zealand 12 
China 1  Nigeria 2 
Croatia 6  Norway 12 
Cyprus 2  Poland 11 
Czech Republic 28  Portugal 9 
Denmark 13  Romania 17 
Estonia 10  Russian Federation 6 
Finland 11  Serbia & Montenegro 2 
France 6  Slovakia 7 
Georgia 8  Slovenia 11 
Germany 12  South Africa 4 
Greece 22  Spain 7 
Hungary 15  Sweden 11 
Iceland 4  Switzerland 5 
India 7  Turkey 5 
Ireland 16  Ukraine 11 
Italy 7  United Kingdom 11 
Japan 9  United States 19 
Kazakhstan 7  Uzbekistan 3 
   TOTAL 529 
Note: Countries in italics are not included in this paper due to too low response rate. 
 28
Appendix B: Survey Questionnaire (extract) 
 
q2. Thinking about the country you have chosen, how often would you say the 
following occurs today? [Response scale from 1.“Hardly ever” to 7.“Almost always”] 
a. When recruiting public sector employees, the skills and merits of the applicants 
decide who gets the job? 
b. When recruiting public sector employees, the political connections of the 
applicants decide who gets the job? 
c. Public sector employees are hired via a formal examination system? 
d. The top political leadership hires and fires senior public officials? 
e. Senior public officials are recruited from within the ranks of the public sector? 
f. Once one is recruited as a public sector employee, one stays a public sector 
employee for the rest of one’s career? 
g. Firms that provide the most favorable kickbacks to senior officials are awarded 
public procurement contracts in favor of firms making the lowest bid? 
h. When deciding how to implement policies in individual cases, public sector 
employees treat some groups in society unfairly? 
j. When granting licenses to start up private firms, public sector employees favor 
applicants with which they have strong personal contacts? 
k. Senior officials have salaries that are comparable with the salaries of private sector 
managers with roughly similar training and responsibilities? 
l. The salaries of public sector employees are linked to appraisals of their 
performance? 
m. When found guilty of misconduct, public sector employees are reprimanded by 
proper bureaucratic mechanisms? 
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q8. To what extent would you say the following applies today to the country you have 
chosen to submit your answers for? [Response scale from 1.“Not at all” to 7.“To a 
very large extent”] 
a. Public sector employees strive to be efficient? 
b. Public sector employees strive to implement the policies decided upon by the top 
political leadership? 
c. Public sector employees strive to help clients? 
d. Public sector employees strive to follow rules? 
e. Public sector employees strive to fulfil the ideology of the party/parties in 
government? 
f. The terms of employment for public sector employees are regulated by special 
laws that do not apply to private sector employees? 
g. The provision of public services is subject to competition from private sector 
companies, NGOs or other public agencies? 
h. The provision of public services is funded by user fees and/or private insurances 
rather than taxes? 
i. Women are proportionally represented among public sector employees? 
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Table 1. Causal mechanisms to reduce corruption and their observable indicators.  
 
Causal  Mechanisms 
 
Observable Bureaucratic Features 
 
1. Competence 
The key is to “select better types” 
 
1a. Meritocratic recruitment (candidates are 
“screened” according to their merit) 
 
1b. Competitive Formal Examinations 
(candidates “signal” their merit)  
 
2. Esprit de Corps 
The key is to “create better types” through 
socialization in certain values, strong ties 
among the members of the Corps and 
isolation from external influences  
 
2a. Career stability / Secure tenure. 
 
2b. Internal promotions (in opposition to 
lateral entries). 
 
2c. Special laws for public employment (in 
opposition to standard labor laws). 
 
3. Temptation  
The key is to pay bureaucrats enough, so as 
they do not engage in corrupt behavior to 
complement their salaries   
 
3. Competitive salaries in the public sector.  
4. Separation of interests 
 The interests of principals and bureaucratic 
agents are separated because they are 
responsive to different chains of 
accountability 
 
4a. Meritocratic recruitment (candidates are 
“screened” according to their merit) 
 
4b. Non-politicization of public service 
posts. 
 
4c. Internal promotions (in opposition to 
lateral entries). 
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Table 2. Two Dimensions of Weberianism. 
 Professionalism Closedness 
Meritocratic recruitment (q2_a)   .90 –.07 
Political recruitment (q2_b) –.93   .10 
Political elite recruits senior officials (q2_d) –.82 –.17 
Senior officials internally recruited (q2_e)   .81   .27 
Formal examination system (q2_c)   .02   .80 
Lifelong careers (q2_f)   .34   .80 
Special employment laws (q8_f) –.26   .72 
Competitive salaries (q2_k)   .14 –.51 
Note: Entries are varimax rotated factors loadings for the first factors retained from a 
principal components factor analysis at the country level (n=52). Loadings >.5 or <–.5 
are highlighted in bold, questionnaire items (see Appendix B) within parentheses. 
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Table 3. Bureaucratic Professionalism and Corruption (WLS estimates). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Professionalism –0.36*** –0.27*** –0.30*** –0.32*** –0.19** 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Log(GDP/cap) –0.94*** –0.57*** –0.22 –0.57** –0.20 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.20) (0.26) (0.12) 
Education 0.00 –0.00  –0.00  
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01)  
ELF –0.31   –0.09  
 (0.38)   (0.38)  
Level of democracy   –0.00 0.00   
  (Polity)  (0.02) (0.02)   
Level of democracy    0.07  
  (Freedom House)    (0.04)  
Years of democracy  –0.01* –0.01* –0.00 –0.01 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Political constraints  –0.96**   –0.38 
  (0.44)   (0.43) 
Protestantism  –0.01***  –0.01*** –0.01*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Confucianism    0.60  
    (0.39)  
Freedom of the press   0.01*  0.02** 
   (0.01)  (0.01) 
Newspapers   0.00   
   (0.00)   
Television sets    –0.00   
   (0.00)   
Female representation   –0.02***  –0.00 
   (0.01)  (0.01) 
Years open to trade   0.01   
   (0.01)   
Inverse of district     0.42  
   magnitude    (0.95)  
Share of legislators el-    –0.35  
   ected by plurality vote    (0.83)  
Trade volume    –0.00  
    (0.00)  
OECD member    –0.15  
    (0.24)  
No. of countries 50 47 43 38 47 
Adjusted R-squared 0.811 0.900 0.923 0.892 0.942 
* significant at .10-level, ** significant at .05-level, *** significant at .01-level.  
Note: Entries are Weighted Least Squares regression coefficients (standard errors within 
parentheses), with the inverse of the estimated error variance in the corruption perceptions 
measure used as weight. The dependent variable is the inverse of the WB “Control of 
corruption” indicator from 2007. Model (5) contains regional dummies for Western, Latin 
American, African and Asian countries. The Constant term has been suppressed from the 
table. 
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Table 4. Components, mechanisms, and endogeneity (WLS estimates). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Professionalism –0.15*   –0.09  
 (0.08)   (0.07)  
Closedness 0.06     
 (0.06)     
Competitive salaries –0.07     
 (0.05)     
Meritocratic recruitment  –0.15* –0.18**  –0.15** 
  (0.08) (0.07)  (0.06) 
Politicized recruitment  0.10    
  (0.07)    
Internal promotion  0.04    
  (0.07)    
Formal examinations   0.01   
   (0.05)   
Lifelong careers   0.05   
   (0.08)   
Special employment    0.04   
   laws   (0.08)   
Corruption in 1996    0.35*** 0.33*** 
    (0.10) (0.09) 
Observations 47 47 47 47 47 
Adjusted R-squared 0.948 0.949 0.947 0.957 0.962 
* significant at.10-level, ** significant at.05-level, *** significant at.01-level.  
Note: Entries are Weighted Least Squares regression coefficients, with standard errors 
within parentheses, and the inverse of the estimated error variance in the corruption 
perceptions measure used as weight. The dependent variable is the inverse of the WB 
“Control of corruption” indicator from 2007. All models include the same control variables 
as model (5) of Table 3: Years of democracy, Political constraints, Protestantism, Freedom 
of the press, Female representation and regional dummies. The Constant term has been 
suppressed from the table. 
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Figure 1. Bureaucratic Professionalism (country scores) 
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Figure 2. Bureaucratic Closedness (country scores) 
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Figure 3. Competitive Salaries (country scores) 
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Figure 4a. Partial regression plot 
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Figure 4b. Partial regression plot, excluding Albania, Italy & Iceland 
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